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 1 
Paradoxes of Religious Freedom and Repression in (Post-)Soviet Contexts 
 
Mathijs Pelkmans 
Associate Professor, Department of Anthropology, London School of Economics. 
 
Abstract 
The religious revival that followed the collapse of the USSR provides an excellent 
opportunity to compare the dynamics of projects of religious freedom with those of religious 
repression. Based on extensive ethnographic fieldwork in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, this 
article documents the contradictory effects that both repressive and liberal policies and laws 
have on religious expression. Thus, while Soviet anti-religious policies undeniably caused 
much suffering and hardship, religious repression also contributed to an intensification of 
religious experience among certain Muslim and evangelical groups. And while religious 
freedom laws expanded the scope for public religious organization and expression, they also 
produced new inequalities between religious groups, as the cases of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan 
demonstrate. Ultimately, the article shows that the effects of liberal and repressive laws are 
far from straightforward and need to be analyzed in relation to the social context in which 
they are applied. 
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Introduction 
Consider an imam in Ajara (Georgia) who longs for the Soviet period when religion was 
repressed; imagine a state functionary in Kyrgyzstan who complains about the unfairness of 
religious freedom. How to explain such nostalgia for religious repression expressed by the 
 2 
practitioners of a formerly repressed faith? What does “religious freedom” look like when the 
law itself is fragile? This article looks to post-Soviet examples to reveal contradictions in 
regimes of religious freedom and repression. In considering the unintended consequences of 
religious freedom, it also draws attention to how laws about religion relate to the exercise of 
other forms of power in situations of social and political turmoil and transition. 
Recent scholarship on the subject of religious freedom has revealed how the Christian and 
liberal roots of the modern categories of “religion” and “freedom” have contributed to the 
emergence of a “political doctrine of freedom” that affects religious groups in multiple ways.1 
For one, it requires religious groups to disentangle religious and non-religious aspects of life.
2
 
This is so because “religious freedom” projects tend to equate religion with interiorized 
belief, which restricts and shapes the ways in which religion enters the public sphere.
3
 
Moreover, the Western construction of freedom rests on a semiotic ideology that underwrites 
the “autonomy supposed of a free agent” and is based on a separation of language from action 
that reflects a Protestant bias, but is incongruous with the semiotic ideologies of many other 
religious traditions.
4
 
 The post-Soviet liberalizations of the religious sphere have similarly shown that 
“freedom” affects religious groups in many ways, producing not only opportunities but also 
new constraints, and creating new inequalities. By tracing the (sometimes contradictory) 
effects of post-Soviet liberalization, this essay contributes to the critical discussion of 
“religious freedom.” However, it argues that this discussion needs to be complemented by 
                                                 
1
 See Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “Believing in Religious Freedom,” The Immanent Frame (blog), March 1, 2012, 
http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/03/01/believing-in-religious-freedom/; Courtney Bender, “The Power of Pluralist 
Thinking,” The Immanent Frame (blog), April 11, 2012, http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/04/11/the-power-of-
pluralist-thinking/. 
2
 For a concise discussion of this issue, see Bender, “The Power of Pluralist Thinking.” 
3
 Talal Asad suggests that affording people “the right to choose their religious beliefs” is in a secular world 
“everything that the modern state can afford to let go”: Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, 
Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 147. For a recent discussion on this topic, see 
Robert Yelle, “Christian Genealogies of Religious Freedom,” The Immanent Frame (blog), April 6, 2012, 
http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/04/06/christian-genealogies-of-religious-freedom/.  
4
 See especially Webb Keane, “Freedom and Blasphemy: On Indonesian Press Bans and Danish Cartoons,” 
Public Culture 21, no. 1, (2009): 47–76.  
 3 
attention to its opposites: “religious unfreedom” or, applied to the politico-legal domain, 
“religious repression.” Such an effort will add a sense of grounding to discussions of 
freedom, and draw attention to the fact that not only “religious freedom projects” but also 
“religious repression projects” are characterized by multiple contradictions.  
 The post-Soviet world offers a useful case precisely because it allows us to study 
religious freedom and repression together. The collapse of the USSR marked the end of 
seventy years of anti-religious policies that severely curtailed religious expression and 
controlled religious institutions—at times co-opting and at other times brutally repressing 
those institutions—with the aim of effecting the demise of religion; an aim which was never 
fully realized. The post-1991 era was radically different, at least in those newly independent 
countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Georgia that adopted and implemented liberal laws 
regarding religious expression and organization. It might be expected that religious leaders 
and practitioners would have a straightforwardly positive view of this widening scope for 
religious activities, but this was not always the case, as I explain using two examples from 
my ethnographic research
5
: 
 
In 2001, the imam of a small town in Ajara, a predominantly Muslim region of 
Georgia, told me, “During communism we had more freedom; we still had our own 
lives. Now, we are losing everything.”6 
 
In 2004, I conversed with a Pentecostal pastor in Kyrgyzstan about the forms of 
opposition his church encountered in this Muslim-majority context. He remarked: 
                                                 
5
 Ethnographic research in Ajara, Georgia, was carried out during eighteen months in the period 1997 to 2001, 
and ethnographic research in Kyrgyzstan was conducted over twenty months in the period 2003 to 2010. The 
examples I present have all been drawn from this research. Some have been presented in previously published 
work, as indicated in the footnotes. 
6
 Mathijs Pelkmans, Defending the Border: Identity, Religion, and Modernity in the Republic of Georgia (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 121. 
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“We pray for [local government] officials to stop hindering us. But this may not be 
God’s way. Our faith thrives when it is being repressed.” 
 
These two examples reveal a rather odd longing for religious repression, but they do so in 
quite distinct ways. The imam’s intimation that the new era of religious freedom was less free 
than the era of repression points to tensions that have accompanied the post-Soviet de-
privatization of religion, which can render certain religious tenets more vulnerable or 
disadvantaged than they previously had been. By contrast, the Pentecostal pastor did not so 
much call “freedom” into question as suggest that freedom is not necessarily beneficial to a 
church like his. The unstated logic was that religious movements can only retain their 
effervescence as long as they provide their members with a sense of exclusivity, that is, when 
boundaries are maintained with society at large. Neither the imam’s nor the pastor’s comment 
should be accepted at face value, but they do require a re-evaluation of what is meant by 
“religious repression” and by “religious freedom.” Indirectly they also draw attention to the 
role of the law, which brings us to two further examples: 
 
In 2004, a functionary of the state committee of religious affairs in Kyrgyzstan lamented 
to me: “[These evangelical missionaries] come here and only want to talk about religious 
freedom. They only talk about rights, rights, rights! For them it is easy. After a few years 
they leave again, having no idea about the mess they leave behind.”7 
 
Studying the Tablighi Jamaat (a Muslim piety movement) in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, I asked 
about the impact of a 2009 law prohibiting proselytizing activities by their movement. 
                                                 
7
 Mathijs Pelkmans, “Asymmetries on the ‘Religious Market’ in Kyrgyzstan,” in The Postsocialist Religious 
Question: Faith and Power in Central Asia and East-Central Europe, eds. C. M. Hann, et al. (Berlin: Lit 
Verlag, 2006), 32. 
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They were untroubled, in the words of one of them: “[P]eople have gotten used to our 
approach. This law is only intended for Jehovah Witnesses.” 
 
These examples point out that the law is only as effective as its implementation, but they do 
so in different ways. In the first example we see that the law can become a tool to advance the 
interests of some religious groups, and in the second example we see a glimpse of the uneven 
application of the law by power holders. Both examples call attention to the interplay 
between the law and the social field in which it operates. 
 These brief ethnographic vignettes raise several important questions. A first set of 
questions pertains to the possibilities and impossibilities that are (inadvertently) produced by 
liberal and repressive laws: What forms of “freedom” does religious repression produce? 
What constraints and impossibilities are produced through religious freedom? A second set of 
questions relates to the ways in which religious freedom laws are pushed, applied, ignored, 
and used. More concretely: Who “owns” religious freedom laws and to what effect? How can 
religious freedom laws be variously employed? 
The next section discusses these questions in the context of the changing position of 
Islam in the Georgian province of Ajara, specifically in light of the increasingly close 
connection between Georgian nationality and Orthodox Christianity. In section three the 
geographical focus shifts to Kyrgyzstan, a country that radically lifted restrictions on religion 
in the early 1990s, thereby producing a relatively open religious field, until, starting in 2008, 
a series of more restrictive laws were adopted.  
 
From repression to freedom . . . or vice versa? 
So what was the freedom in repression to which the imam in Ajara (Georgia) alluded? 
It is important to point out that he was not referring to the Stalinist repressions of the 1920s 
 6 
and 1930s, decades that were characterized by a rapidly dwindling tolerance for religious 
institutions and for public religious expression. In Ajara this period had been marked by a 
heavy-handedly repressed rebellion that had been prompted by the unveiling campaign of 
1929, the closure of all 172 madrasas and 158 mosques (except one in the provincial capital 
Batumi), and the imprisonment of unwilling religious leaders.
8
 Rather, the imam was 
referring to the anti-religious efforts of the 1960s to 1980s that had focused on eradicating the 
so-called “backward and harmful traditions” by targeting religious holidays and rituals and 
disseminating atheist and anti-religious ideas through the media and in schools.
9
 The 
combined effect was that “religion” disappeared from much of public life, but the resulting 
status quo also implied that there was room for religious expression in a more “domesticated” 
fashion, to use Dragadze’s term.10  
 Importantly, Moscow’s anti-religious line was not always followed in local contexts.11 
As is often noted about Muslim regions of the Soviet Union, even local officials (Communist 
Party members) would sometimes participate in religious events such as circumcision feasts 
and Islamic funerals.
12
 The popular Soviet joke “they pretend to pay us and we pretend to 
work” could with some justification be adapted as “they pretend to eradicate religion, and we 
pretend not to practice religion.” Put differently, there was more room for religious 
expression in the late Soviet period than the image of the “totalitarian” USSR tends to 
project. 
                                                 
8
 Giorgi Sanikidze, islami da muslimebi tanamedrove sakartveloshi [Islam and Muslims in Modern Georgia] 
(Tbilisi: The International Research Center for East–West Relations, 1999), 16–17. 
9
 Christel Lane, 1981. The Rites of Rulers: Ritual in Industrial Society—The Soviet Case (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1981), 27-29; Yaacov Ro'i, “The Task of Creating the New Soviet Man: ‘Atheistic 
Propaganda’ in the Soviet Muslim Areas,” Europe‐Asia Studies 36, no. 1, (1984): 26-44. 
10
 Domesticated refers both to the state’s “taming” or controlling of religious organization and practice, as well 
as to the shift of religious practice from the public to the domestic sphere. Tamara Dragadze, “The 
Domestication of Religion under Soviet Communism,” in Socialism: Ideals, Ideologies, and Local Practice, ed. 
C. M. Hann (London: Routledge, 1993), 148–56. 
11
 Reuel Hanks, “Repression as Reform: Islam in Uzbekistan during the Early Glasnost Period,” Religion, State 
& Society 29, no. 3, (2001): 227–39. 
12
 Yaacov Ro’i, Islam in the Soviet Union: From the Second World War to Gorbachev (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000), 648–51. 
 7 
 Moreover, there is a certain “freedom” in being able to affiliate oneself with a 
religious tradition without conforming to doctrinal demands. During Soviet times religious 
affiliation did not always have to be accompanied with other displays of commitment such as 
fasting, regular prayer, or abstaining from alcohol, because the ban on religion made this 
either impossible or provided a good excuse not to be bothered. In the words of a villager in 
Ajara: “[W]e were Muslims, of course, but we could only pray inside our homes. We didn’t 
think badly of anyone who drank at work or offered wine to guests, as those things were 
simply unavoidable.”13  
Such possibilities were convenient to those who were “not very religious” and tended 
to think about religion mostly in terms of (family) tradition, but what about those who cared a 
great deal about the doctrinal aspects of their faith? The Pentecostal pastor quoted in the 
introduction alluded to the possibility that the intensity of faith-based communal life may 
flourish in situations of repression. Similar suggestions emerged from stories of devout 
elderly men in Ajara, one of whom commented, with a smile: “We knew exactly, with every 
neighbour, what you could and couldn’t say. In this way we were able to spread 
information.”14 The danger of being reported and restrictions on carrying out religious rituals 
or circulating forbidden literature produced an intensification of ties between committed 
members of religious communities. The exclusivity of such “secret societies” is illustrated by 
the adoption in one village of a locally produced Muslim calendar based on the moon and the 
stars, which resulted in the villagers starting Ramadan two days before the rest of the Muslim 
world. When the possibilities of external communication revealed this discrepancy in the 
1990s, the villagers refused for at least another decade to conform to the official Islamic 
calendar.  
                                                 
13
 Pelkmans, Defending the Border, 128. 
14
 Ibid., 108. 
 8 
  A final point that illustrates how religious repression may inadvertently invigorate 
religious affiliation relates to politics. Disillusionment with communist rule was widespread 
in the 1970s and 1980s. The state’s anti-religious stance meant that religious activities 
derived part of their attraction from the side benefit that they also constituted political acts of 
resistance. Indeed, claiming to be a Muslim or a Christian could serve to detach oneself from 
a corrupt and bankrupt regime. In response, post-Soviet governments often tried to distance 
themselves from their atheist predecessors and legitimize their rule through religion. This was 
often successful, at least for a while, but in some cases the fact that religion became part of 
the political status quo detracted from its attractiveness (the case of Turkmenistan is 
particularly instructive in this regard).
15
 None of this is to ignore or downplay the horrific fate 
of tens of thousands of clergy, the desperation of those who sent off their deceased in an 
unholy manner, or the countless people who lost their positions because their relatives were 
linked to religious institutions. But it is important to highlight some of the counterintuitive 
effects of religious repression: repression created opportunities (and some liberties), some of 
which were lost when the ban on religion was lifted. 
These historical facts may clarify the imam’s selective nostalgia informing his 
statement that “during communism we had more freedom,” but it does not clarify the implied 
indictment of post-Soviet religious “freedom.” He elaborated on this further: “You know 
what the bitter thing is in all this? Finally we are able to freely carry out our beliefs, but now 
Islam is in decline. Satan is playing his own game.”16 He was indirectly referring to the 
difficulties he experienced in persuading villagers to attend Friday prayers and the fact that he 
had been witnessing a steady process of conversion to Orthodox Christianity since the early 
1990s. 
                                                 
15
 In post-1990 Turkmenistan the government pushed a state-endorsed version of Islam not least to legitimize its 
rule, but the state-controlled mosques have remained conspicuously empty. Chris Hann and Mathijs Pelkmans, 
“Realigning Religion and Power in Central Asia: Islam, Nation-State and (Post)Socialism,” Europe-Asia Studies 
61, no. 9, (2009): 1517–41.  
16
 Pelkmans, Defending the Border, 123. 
 9 
To understand the context, it is important to remember that Ajara had been part of the 
Ottoman Empire from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, and its inhabitants had converted 
to Islam during that time. When the region became part of Soviet Georgia (as an Autonomous 
Republic) its Georgian-speaking inhabitants were classified as Georgians even though their 
religious affiliation set them apart from other (non-Ajaran) Georgians who were Orthodox 
Christians. The Soviet domestication of religion proved useful in the sense that it allowed 
Ajarans to continue to be Muslim at home while increasingly becoming secular (Soviet) 
Georgians in public. This fragile balance was disrupted when in the 1990s Georgian 
nationality was framed in Orthodox Christian terms, as part of a process to overcome the 
Soviet ideological legacy and reconnect with the long historical roots of the imagined 
Georgian nation. Despite this larger national religious framework, the new situation did bring 
more freedom to practice Islam openly: new mosques were constructed and madrasas were 
opened, young men studied abroad at Islamic universities, and elderly people went on hajj. 
However, the return of religion to public life made it problematic to be simultaneously 
Muslim and Georgian, a conundrum that had the effect of eroding the Muslim community.
17
 
It is within this context that the imam’s nostalgia for religious repression makes perfect sense.  
These examples are instructive for other Soviet and post-Soviet settings as well, 
especially those in which ethnic and religious affiliations have been closely intertwined. 
Religious freedom tends to increase the expectation that religious affiliation is accompanied 
by behavior deemed appropriate for that specific faith. During Soviet times, identifying as a 
Muslim was often a matter of ethnic background. If you were Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Azeri, or 
                                                 
17
 I have discussed this history more extensively in Pelkmans, Defending the Border, 95-119. See also Thomas 
Liles, “Islam and Religious Transformation in Adjara,” Working Paper 57 (European Centre for Minority 
Issues, 2012); Ekatherina Meiering Mikadze, “L'Islam en Adjarie: Trajectoire historique et implications 
contemporaines,” CEMOTI. Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien 27 
(1999): 241-261. 
 10 
Ajaran, you were Muslim by default.
18
 The repression of religion meant that it was acceptable 
to drink alcohol, to refrain from participating in Ramadan activities, and to abstain from daily 
prayers. By contrast, religious freedom meant that such behaviours became more 
controversial—religious affiliation obtained more content. For significant groups of people 
this created problems: Can a Georgian be Muslim? Is it possible to be a divorced Muslim 
woman? Can you consider yourself Muslim if you drink alcohol or eat pork? Intriguingly, 
while during Soviet times anti-religious activists would frequently voice their frustration with 
people who insisted that they were Muslim because they were of a specific ethnic 
background, after 1991 newly trained imams complained about the same attitude. For the 
former, the amalgamation of ethnic and religious affiliation prevented people from becoming 
true socialists
19
; for the latter, the problem was that it prevented people from becoming true 
Muslims. 
 Moreover, “religious freedom” is more “free” for some than for others. In Ajara the 
key asymmetry was that Muslims had to compete against a well-funded Orthodox Christian 
church that was backed by a powerful national discourse according to which Georgians ought 
to be Christian. Elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, many of the “traditional religions” (a 
term reserved for religions that existed before the Soviet period) felt that they were up against 
unfair competition against, especially, rich evangelical denominations based in Western 
Europe or North America.
20
 Conversely, representatives of newly active religious groups felt 
that they were disadvantaged by the distinction made between “traditional” and “non-
                                                 
18
 Pelkmans, Defending the Border, 121–41; Adeeb Khalid, Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in 
Central Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). 
19
 Chantal Lemercier‐Quelquejay, “From Tribe to Umma,” Central Asian Survey 53, no. 3, (1984): 473-78. 
20
 John Witte, Jr., “Introduction,” in Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls, eds. John 
Witte, Jr. and Michael Bourdeaux (New York: Orbis, 2009), 1–27. 
 11 
traditional” religions, a distinction that was enshrined in many religion laws across the former 
Soviet Union.
21
 
 It is undeniable that the end of communism dramatically widened the scope for 
religious activity in the former Soviet states. This has been evidenced by the vibrant 
construction of mosques and churches, the reappearance of religious symbols in public life, 
the return of clergy in public positions of various kinds, and the virtual evaporation of atheist 
ideology. However, the return of religion to the public sphere also brought with it new 
tensions new constraints. These vary from social pressure to participate in religious activities 
to new dynamics of exclusion that accompany the politicization of religion: the entanglement 
of religious and national identities, the sacralisation of secular power, and the impact of the 
global discourse of (counter-)terrorism.
22
 These ironies warn against making simple 
assumptions about either “repression” or “freedom,” and draw attention to how possibilities 
and impossibilities for religious expression graft onto different social realities. 
 
Contradictions of the Law 
 
The religious freedom guaranteed in the constitution of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan 
includes the right of every citizen to freely and independently choose his/her relation 
to religion, to individually or with others profess any religion, or not to profess any, to 
                                                 
21
 Alexander Agadjanian, “Revising Pandora’s Gifts: Religious and National Identity in the Post-Soviet Societal 
Fabric,” Europe-Asia Studies 53, no. 3, (2001): 473–88; see especially Ibid., 481–84. 
22
 An extensive discussion of these issues is Chris Hann and Mathijs Pelkmans, “Realigning Religion and Power 
in Central Asia: Islam, Nation-State and (Post)Socialism,” Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 9 (2009): 1517–41. The 
most insightful study of how global discourses of (counter)terrorism have affected the politico-religious 
landscape in Kyrgyzstan is Julie McBrien, “Extreme Conversations: Secularism, Religious Pluralism, and the 
Rhetoric of Islamic Extremism in Southern Kyrgyzstan,” in The Postsocialist Religious Question: Faith and 
Power in Central Asia and East-Central Europe, eds. C. M. Hann, et al. (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006), 47-74. 
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change one’s religious conviction, and also to voice and spread one’s conviction as 
related to religion.
23
 
 
When discussing the contradictions of religious freedom laws, the case of Kyrgyzstan is 
instructive because of the speed with which the country lifted virtually all restrictions on 
religious activity after the collapse of communism. Indeed, one remarkable aspect of the 
Kyrgyz law quoted above is the date—signed only four months after the disintegration of the 
USSR. The law explicitly forbade any differentiation in the treatment of religious groups and 
confirmed the separation of religion and state. Unlike other Central Asian countries such as 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which signed liberal religion laws but quickly amended them or 
restricted religious activity in practice notwithstanding changes to the law,
24
 the Kyrgyz 
government by and large stayed away from religious regulation until around 2005.
25
 It is for 
these reasons that the US Center for World Mission
26
 described Kyrgyzstan as “the most 
open Muslim country” in the mid-1990s.27 Even Forum 18, a Scandinavia-based religious-
rights nongovernmental organization that dogmatically promotes “the fundamental human 
right” to worship, to change one’s religion, and express one’s beliefs, acknowledged that in 
                                                 
23
 Law of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan on Religious Freedom and Religious Organization, chap. 1, art. 3, 
December 16, 1991. 
24
 A good discussion of the situation in Uzbekistan is Reuel Hanks, “Religion and Law in Uzbekistan: 
Renaissance and Repression in an Authoritarian Context,” in Regulating Religion: Case Studies from around the 
Globe, ed. James T. Richardson (New York: Kluwer Academic, 2004), 319–30. For Kazakhstan, see Roman 
Podoprigora, “Religious Freedom and Human Rights in Kazakhstan,” Religion, State & Society 31, no. 2, 
(2003): 123–32. 
25
 Nuria Kutnaeva, “Svoboda veroispovedania v Tsental’noi Azii. Teoria i praktika” [Freedom of Religion in 
Central Asia. Theory and Practice] n.d; see also John Anderson, Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia’s Island of 
Democracy? (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999), 32–33. 
26
 The US Center for World Mission, located in Pasadena, California, is the central evangelical research centre 
and think tank committed to missionary work around the world: see the center’s website at 
https://www.uscwm.org (accessed August 19, 2014). 
27
 As mentioned by Mark Palmer, coordinator for the US missionary organization Campus Crusade for Christ in 
Kyrgyzstan between 1992 and 2004. 
 13 
Kyrgyzstan “both registered and unregistered religious communities were able to function 
freely” between the early 1990s and 2005.28  
This state of affairs was not, however, seen as an unequivocal blessing by everyone. 
When a state official pointed out to me in 2004 that “our laws on religion are far more liberal 
than those held by European countries,” he was not boasting about the liberal credentials of 
his country, but rather bemoaning what he saw as a chaotic situation. This sentiment dovetails 
with the functionary quoted in the introduction who complained about the law being abused 
by Evangelical missionaries. Both reveal tensions between the law and the state, prompting 
the questions: Who controls the law? What are the possibilities for using and manipulating it?  
The Kyrgyz government’s endorsement of religious freedom was part of a larger 
“shock therapy” package designed by the IMF and the World Bank that was accepted by the 
Kyrgyz government in the early 1990s.
29
 These reforms had unforeseen and often undesired 
effects. Contradicting all expert knowledge, the dismantling of the planned economy failed to 
attract hoped-for foreign direct investment. In the religious sphere, by contrast, the 
government had assumed that “traditional religions” would resume their activities. Ironically, 
economic investment did not materialize, but liberalization did trigger significant religious 
“foreign direct investment” in the form of Evangelical missions and Islamic renewal 
movements such as the Tablighi Jamaat.
30
 Evangelical and Pentecostal missions started to 
have significant success in attracting converts among both the Russian minority and (mostly 
                                                 
28
 Mushfig Bayram and John Kinahan, “Kyrgyzstan: Religious Freedom Survey, December 2009,” Forum 18 
News Service, December 17, 2009, http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1388&pdf=Y. 
29
 Rafis Abazov, “Policy of Economic Transition in Kyrgyzstan,” Central Asian Survey 18, no. 2, (1999): 197–
223. 
30
 The Tablighi Jamaat,  which nowadays is a global movement, has its origins in 1920s India; it focuses on 
spiritual reformation at the grassroots level. A good source on the movement’s history is Marc Gaborieau, “The 
transformation of Tablighi Jama’at into a transnational movement,” Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi 
Jama’at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal, ed. Khalid Masud (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 121-
l38. The expansion of the Tablighi Jamaat into post-Soviet Central Asia is discussed by Bayram Balci, “The rise 
of the Jama'at al Tabligh in Kyrgyzstan: the revival of Islamic ties between the Indian subcontinent and Central 
Asia?” Central Asian Survey 31, no. 1 (2012): 61-76. 
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female) Kyrgyz of Muslim background.
31
 The Tablighi Jamaat also became increasingly 
popular, especially among young urban Kyrgyz men.
32
 
Such proliferation of religious activity is hardly surprising, but it was not the 
“religious revival” that the government had desired or anticipated. State functionaries, 
representatives of the “traditional religions,”33 and segments of the general population34 saw 
the religious proliferation and diversification as undermining the national integrity of the 
country, and creating tensions at the local level. Consider the words of Murzakhalilov, the 
previously mentioned specialist at the State Agency for Religious Affairs: 
  
The situation is a complex one: on the one hand, there is freedom of conscience; on 
the other, the need to legally regulate what the religious organizations and 
missionaries are doing . . . we need new laws . . . to keep within limits those religious 
organizations that may change the traditional family and clan relations and traditional 
religious preferences, and upset the religious balance in the republic.
35
 
 
It might be tempting to dismiss this statement as revealing a lingering Soviet mentality, 
including an obsession with control. Even so, the expressed concerns trigger a question: Who 
                                                 
31
 See Mathijs Pelkmans, “Temporary Conversions: Encounters with Pentecostalism in Muslim Kyrgyzstan,” in 
Conversion after Socialism: Disruptions, Modernisms and Technologies of Faith in the Former Soviet Union, 
ed. Mathijs Pelkmans (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 143–66; Mathijs Pelkmans, “‘Culture’ as a Tool and 
an Obstacle: Missionary Encounters in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 
13, no. 4, (2007): 881–99. 
32
 In 2003, 710 Christian and 232 Muslim missionaries were officially registered, according to O. 
Mamaiusupov, Voprosy (problemy) religii na perekhodnom periode [Questions (Problems) of Religion in the 
Transition Period] (Bishkek, 2003). The number of Kyrgyz converts to Evangelical and Pentecostal churches 
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benefits from full-stop religious liberalization and with what effects? Proponents of religious 
liberalization often apply the notion of a “religious market” to stress that—like economic 
liberalization—it is the best available model not only to stimulate growth, but also to reach 
equilibrium. Like all markets, however, the “religious market” contains inequalities and 
asymmetries.
36
 In Kyrgyzstan, far-reaching religious liberalization was particularly beneficial 
to religious groups that had transnational financial connections, a strong mission component, 
a focus on the individual, and an emphasis on disentangling faith and culture. Moreover, the 
rapid growth of such groups hardly indicated an emerging “equilibrium” but instead produced 
social friction at the local level. 
 In The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, Winnifred Sullivan draws attention to the 
fact that law and religion “speak in languages largely opaque to each other.”37 The key 
problem is that religious freedom laws require religion to be delimited when it is impossible 
to draw unambiguous lines between religion and culture, especially with regards to everyday 
life. In the cases she analyzes, the effect is that “lived religion” remains unprotected or even 
opposed by the law (hence the title of her book). I agree with Sullivan’s argument, but I 
suggest that apart from leaving lived religion unprotected, the impossibility of delimiting 
religion may also offer opportunities. Indeed, it partly explains why Soviet authorities were 
unable to eradicate religion. They aimed to eradicate “religion” while promoting “culture,” 
which meant that significant aspects of “lived religion” remained out of sight.38 Here I make 
a related argument: the impossibility of delimitation provided room for circumventing the law 
in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. This is so because sometimes the issue is less about having one’s 
religious activities recognized as religion, and more about having religious activities 
recognized as non-religion. Evangelical missions were very skilled in producing this blurring 
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effect; in doing so they were able to both circumvent the law and avoid the various 
controversies their presence and activities were likely to produce in a Muslim-majority 
context.  
To appreciate this point it is important to note that although Kyrgyzstan’s liberal laws 
between 1992 and 2008 did offer opportunities for foreign-originating religious activities, the 
evangelical proselytizing activities among people of Muslim background continued to be 
controversial. Moreover, foreign “religious workers” had to be registered, and this could be a 
burdensome and drawn-out process, which could delay mission work by months. One way to 
avoid both the law and public controversy was to present oneself as a nongovernmental 
organization. In the early 2000s there were evangelical micro-loan projects, orphanages and 
centers for street children, cultural nongovernmental organizations promoting “mutual 
understanding,” and even evangelical Internet cafes offering not only the advertised services 
but also spiritual guidance. Their public appearance was “secular”—and they were registered 
as such—but evangelizing was central to their work. It might be tempting to see this as 
“abusing” Kyrgyzstan’s liberal environment (as did the state functionary quoted in the 
introduction), but from the point of view of the missionaries, the essence of being a Christian 
is to share your faith with others, and hence they saw no problem in mixing humanitarian and 
spiritual aid. Evangelical missions often remained unseen and unopposed precisely because 
they skilfully adopted the appearance of the aid industry and were associated with the 
powerful West. Moreover, the strength of their network—including connections with US 
diplomats—served as a guard against infringements of their rights by the host government.39 
While evangelical missions were able to pass as (secular) Western nongovernmental 
organizations, such a guise was unavailable to the Tablighis, for two reasons. First, their dress 
(long white robes) and beards made them instantly recognizable as religious actors. Second, 
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in the post-9/11 context, Islamic piety movements are far more likely to be seen as a security 
threat than Christian missions, even in Muslim-majority countries such as Kyrgyzstan. It 
appears that “religious freedom” is particularly useful to those who fit the freedom picture, 
are able to mobilize market forces, and can manipulate the law. 
As mentioned above, Kyrgyz politicians perceived the religious proliferation as a 
threat to the collective good. They increasingly bemoaned the “excessively” liberal laws, 
which they (quite realistically) perceived as having been imposed on the country by 
international organizations. In response, members of parliament (the Keneş) proposed a series 
of amendments beginning in the late 1990s.
40
 International pressure prevented these 
initiatives from crystallizing for almost a decade, but in 2008 a new religion law was adopted 
which outlawed proselytizing and prohibited religious activities that undermined national 
integrity—an action clearly aimed at the activities of “non-traditional” religions. Religious 
rights movements and representatives of Evangelical churches protested vehemently.
41
 They 
had good reasons to do so because new registration requirements and bans on (vaguely 
defined) forms of proselytizing would bring an end to the era of “religious freedom” that had 
been beneficial to Evangelicals. Apart from several raids on Jehovah Witnesses and some 
closures of evangelical churches,
42
 the full effects of the religion law are not clear yet because 
in 2010 the presidential government was ousted from power and replaced with a potentially 
more liberal but weak parliamentary government. Still, it is useful to refer back to the 
Tablighi quoted in the introduction, who was unperturbed by the adoption of the new religion 
law despite its effect of making illegal their central practice of davat (regular mission trips 
expected of all Tablighis). 
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 The Tablighi’s unworried attitude indicated a realistic view of the fragility of the law, 
combined with a conviction that God’s plan cannot be known. Perhaps it is overreaching to 
call it a “benefit,” but repression may positively contribute to the intensity of religious 
experience. This idea resonated in comments by Tablighis about the suspicion they 
encountered in the 1990s and heroic stories of those who were interrogated or arrested on 
suspicion of links to terrorism. Equally important, however, such stories reveal that the liberal 
laws of the 1990s offered protection to some groups but not to others. The implementation of 
the repressive religion law of 2008 was equally partial. During the previous ten years, the 
Tablighis had extended their links to the Muftiate of Kyrgyzstan, and their activities had 
become familiar, gaining reluctant acceptance by the population at large and the authorities. 
This meant that they received informal protection from local imams as well as the regional 
senior imams (imam-khatib). Their increasingly prominent position and public acceptance 
was much more significant than a change in the law, hence their relative indifference to a law 
that was so vehemently contested by religious rights groups.  
 As the law became more restrictive and the political situation became more 
unstable,
43
 possibilities for secular authorities to randomly exercise force increased. The 
Tablighis were untroubled by the law because they had become integrated into a number of 
informal orders. However, groups that had not been able to secure such a position—because 
they were disconnected, disliked, or both—found themselves in an increasingly vulnerable 
position. The Tablighi quoted in the introduction was correct when asserting that the new law 
would affect Jehovah’s Witnesses, but not them. 
 
Final note 
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“Religious freedom” benefits some religious groups more than others, as seen in my analysis 
of Ajara (Georgia) and Kyrgyzstan. In the latter case, the government’s wish to counteract the 
“uncontrollable flux” produced by its liberal laws was understandable. As Peter Danchin 
mentions, the “‘liberal algebra’ of rights regimes is unable to resolve such conflicts without 
considering . . . different conceptions of collective goods in the historical context of particular 
political communities.”44 This historical context was ignored when religious freedom laws 
were designed for (and imposed on) Kyrgyzstan, and politicians understandably aimed to 
counteract the tensions produced by a law perceived to be alien. This does not mean that the 
repressive turn is in any way desirable—indeed, both religious freedom and religious 
repression are bound to be rife with contradictions and fraught with perils.  
In Kyrgyzstan, liberal laws were unable to protect evenly the interests of all religious 
groups, just as more repressive laws of the late 2000s did not impact all groups equally. The 
experience of the Tablighis was particularly instructive in this regard. During the period of 
religious liberalization they remained unprotected because they did not fit the “freedom” 
picture, while the subsequent more restrictive religion laws did not directly affect them due to 
their improved connections with secular and (state-endorsed) religious authorities. The 
position of Islam in Ajara showed a variation of this dynamic. Here, the end of Soviet 
religious repression increased the public presence of religion, a process which made Muslims 
more visible and vulnerable as a religious minority within the Georgian national context. 
Taken together, the examples presented in this essay have not only shown the uneven effects 
of freedom and repression on different religious groups, but also demonstrated that 
“freedom” and “repression” do not exist as absolutes and may imply each other in a number 
of ways. 
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